Men write, commonly more formally, then they practize: and they conversing onely among bookes, are put into affectation, and pedantisme. Hee that is built of the Presse, and the Pen, shall be sure to make himself ridiculous. Company and Conversation are the best Instructors for a Noble behaviour.
Some time in mid-1642, one of King Charles I's lesser subjects stumbled, bedraggled and unnoticed, onto the streets of London. He was a Scottish minister. Once a royal chaplain, for almost a decade he had rested his modest fortunes on the patronage of Charles's hated Archbishop of Canterbury, William Laud. Now he had been driven from his small and semi-derelict church on the outskirts of Southampton by a congregation determined to eradicate with one blow both the crypto-papist paraphernalia of Laudianism and its local lieutenant, root and branch. Overwhelmed, he had fled from these "swaggering thieves" and headed blindly for the capital. By the time he arrived, Laud's power had been broken. The Archbishop was in the Tower, and the King himself had left London for the last time. A disastrous civil war was about to begin. The fugitive's chances of finding renewed fortune amidst the fervid puritanism now holding sway seemed slim indeed. Yet despite this, he would soon prosper again, and in a new trade. Combat, not with musketry and swordplay but with printing-press and ink, would henceforth become his profession. During the ensuing years, Alexander Ross (1591-1654) would become a prolific authorperhaps the most prolific of all, in a generation certainly not lacking in wordsmiths. Representing himself as a private tutor, he would nonetheless minimize his time spent teaching and maximize that spent writing. Human knowledge would be his subject. Every current theme in religion, philosophy and natural science, from anatomy to predestination, would now be made the theme of a book. He would declaim on subjects as diverse as metaphysics, political order, mythology and cosmology. Atomism, Copernicanism, mortalism and the circulation of the blood would fall within his ambit. It would be a remarkable achievement. Unfortunately for him, however, Ross was destined to take the losing side of every single issue he addressed.
For that reason, Ross has not often found a sympathetic hearing among historians of science. When not simply ignored, he has tended to be conjured as a stock reactionary against whose archaisms may be calibrated the "contributions" made by his more favoured antagonists to the "scientific revolution". 1 Yet by his contemporaries Ross was not dismissed quite so readily. Gentlemen like John Evelyn, Henry Oxinden and Edward Benlowes valued his company, and his patrons included Sir Justinian Isham and, as already noted, Archbishop Laud himself. 2 Following their lead, we, too, may make better use of such a figure. In the first place, Ross was probably more representative in his distrust of new philosophies than many of his opponents in their promulgation of them. He arguably provides a better insight than they on mid-century mentalités. If the historian of science is genuinely interested in reconstructing what past communities have taken to be knowledge, regardless of its retrospective worth, then his opinions warrant attention precisely because they were so pedestrian and conventional. As a Scottish clergyman, moreover, promoted by Laud yet scarred by the experience of Scottish religious politics, Ross represents in microcosm the complexity of cross-cultural politics in England and Scotland in his period -a subject currently of much interest to political historians. 3 In either respect he would make a worthwhile object of study. The present paper, however, pursues a rather different interest. It takes as its starting-point what was most distinctive about Ross for his contemporaries: the extraordinary union of quantity, intensity and futility manifested in his literary labours.
Those labours, whatever else they may have been, were wide-ranging and trenchant. Nor were Ross's writings simply and uninterestingly negative, as a brief and selective survey soon demonstrates. Ross endorsed, and quite possibly composed, the first English translation of the Koran. His survey of the world's religions, Πανσεβεια, proved widely influential and was frequently reprinted. He rewrote Raleigh's History of the world, extending it as far as 1640, and laboured to construct elaborate poems on the life of Christ out of juggled lines from Virgil. His didactic texts on Genesis and mythology proved valuable to other writers, apparently including Milton, and became prescribed texts at Cambridge; they, too, were regularly republished. 4 All these were substantial efforts. Yet somehow in the midst of all this work Ross managed to find time to compose his hostile polemics, and it was for these that he was best known. The victims of these sharp attacks constituted a remarkable list: they included John Wilkins, Nathaniel Carpenter, Philip van Lansberg, Sir Thomas Browne, Kenelm Digby, Robert Overton, Francis Bacon, William Harvey, Jan Amos Comenius, Thomas Hobbes, and an unknown Jesuit from Ingolstadt who called himself "the barber". Perhaps no contemporary writer was as continuously engaged in such a diverse range of duels, and with such a body of antagonists. Readers prepared to scour his publications had at their disposal a comprehensive corpus of responses to the most important writers and ideas of their time. That was why at the Restoration Samuel Butler could sarcastically imagine "an ancient, sage philosopher", whose sole qualification consisted of having "read Alexander Ross over". 5 As the list of his foes suggests, among Ross's central concerns in his tirades were the political and religious ramifications attendant upon different forms of knowledge of Creation. Historians of early modern science, like his contemporaries, can mine his writings for responses to every topic of importance in their field, from atomism to Zoroaster. This paper, however, argues that Ross's works may also be put to use to address methodological questions. So intense was his pugnacity, in fact, that he constitutes a useful resource for what he can reveal not just about the arguments deployed in particular controversies, but about the very practice of debate itself. Ross shared but few assumptions with his opponents as to the bounds of legitimate conduct. As far as they were concerned, he not so much probed those bounds as lurched into them; and from his own perspective, the same seemed true of them. Their arguments consequently necessitated the stipulation of just the kind of important, but generally implicit, maxims which historians of science now like to recover: maxims delimiting the propriety of philosophical advocacy, dissent, and the pursuit of epistemic conflict. Ross's tactics in his many battles thus offer us an opportunity to identify those maxims, and perhaps to discern new ones as they were appearing.
In this context, there is one respect in which Ross is now a particularly intriguing figure. It has been argued by historians such as Steven Shapin that the experimental philosophers of the late Interregnum and Restoration adopted a distinctively novel identity for themselves. They articulated this identity by the creative redeployment of existing and locally powerful cultural resources. In particular, a central element was the characterization of a number of opposing social and epistemological personae with which their own could be contrasted. Three stand out in importance. The first, described by Jacob and others, was the "enthusiast": experimental philosophy was expressly designed to exclude claims to direct personal revelation. Jesuits and radical Protestants alike could be stigmatized with this label. The second was the "dogmatist": experiments, being subjected to communal witnessing, were held to discourage such heroic individual system-builders, of whom Descartes was a controversial example. The third, more recently identified, member of this triumvirate was the "pedant". It is his relation to this third figure that makes Ross especially significant.
Shapin's work on the civility of experimental philosophy has shown in detail how men like Robert Boyle represented natural inquiry as a form of conversation, to be guaranteed by its practitioners' adherence to conventions of polite gentility. Such conventions included, in particular, forbearing from the blunt denial of the truth of another's statements about experiences in the physical world. Those who did act so rudely risked placing themselves beyond the bounds of the nascent community of experimentalists. In contemporary terms, they might be accounted not "prudent", but "pedantic". The manner of a "pedant" was antithetical in every sense to that of the gentleman virtuoso. A pedant was "disputatious, litigious, affected and hectoring". Aiming to dominate, he succeeded only in making himself a slave to (generally Aristotelian) authority. As a result, the kind of knowledge he advocated was itself slavish: it was bookish, inflexible, and, reputedly, resistant to the new possibilities raised by experiments. 6 The attribute of enslavement was particularly telling, since a representative English gentleman clung to few virtues as profoundly as his freedom of action. It is with the figure of the pedant, then, that the historian interested in the civility of early modern science finds the most informative contrasts.
These three personae -the pedant, the dogmatist and the enthusiast -shaded into one another, and they were represented by Boyle and others as sharing distinctive traits. For modern historians, however, a rather different shared attribute is as noteworthy as any noticed by Boyle and his allies. In each case, it is difficult to find contemporary individuals who identified themselves by any such term. Selfproclaimed "enthusiasts", let alone "atheists", are notoriously hard to discern in early modern England. Avowed Hobbists (perhaps the most threatening of dogmatists) are almost equally thin on the ground. 7 But perhaps the situation may be different with respect to pedants. Robert Hooke certainly knew to whom the term should apply. Charged with identifying paradigmatic examples of the "kind of Spirits" who cavilled incessantly at new knowledge -in short, urged to point to a real, flesh-and-blood pedant -Hooke named Alexander Ross. The characterization was current before Hooke, and has survived almost to the present day. And, remarkably enough, Ross himself agreed with it. He could do so because the term 'pedant', unlike its fellows, was not yet unambiguously pejorative. A pedant, strictly speaking, was simply a schoolmaster or tutor, and the straightforward use of the word to denote such individuals persisted throughout the period. It was in this sense that Ross endorsed his own identification as such a beast. He was a pedant indeed, he proclaimed, and proud of it. Distinguishing himself from Thomas Hobbes, for example, Ross thus defended "Pedantry" for what he took it to be: the "book learning" taught by a tutor like him to his pupils, by which "they are instructed in the knowledge of the best things". Far from being inconsistent with civility, it was only by the sustained practice of pedantry that gentlemen were fashioned. In fact, anything which Hobbes had learnt by other means would "never be thought worthy to be called Pedantry". 8 In Alexander Ross we thus have a chance to see a self-proclaimed champion of pedantry challenging the founding figures of the experimental life. He made real a contrast which historians have so far only glimpsed in the pages of conduct books. 9 It may be possible to recover more of the dynamic, practical construction of the gentleman natural philosopher's identity from such a real exchange than we can from relatively static representations gleaned from the pages of printed guides to gentility. In pursuit of this end, the present paper concentrates on just one of the many arguments in which Ross engaged: the one which related most closely to the making of the experimental philosopher. This was his lengthy confrontation with perhaps the most important figure in the making of early experimentalism apart from Boyle, namely John Wilkins. 10 It is likely that Wilkins developed his style of philosophical conduct before Boyle, who was some thirteen years his junior. As such, he was destined to become, next to Boyle himself, the model for the kind of individual who could make the polite conventions of experimentalism work. He was, in Aubrey's succinct estimation, a "prudent" man. Aubrey's term was expressive of modesty, conversational skill and freedom of action -just the attributes of a credible experimental natural philosopher. 11 As one of the early Royal Society's leading figures, Wilkins would have the chance to establish his as the manner of the gentleman virtuoso. But it was precisely in the years of his confrontation with Ross that he had first become recognized as "prudent". 12 Their exchange thus takes on new significance in the context of current historiography. It may be used to confirm or qualify impressions gleaned from textual guides to civility, and to display how the conventions recounted in such guides were put to use before the Royal Society institutionalized their practical application in natural philosophy.
In particular, Ross's exchange with Wilkins came to bear on conventions defining authorship. Who should be regarded as qualified to issue claims to new knowledge, and in what ways, were imperative questions much debated in the period. Recent work has credited the experimental philosophy pioneered by Wilkins not just with a new practical regime of knowledge-making, but with new practices and representations making the advertisement of originality a polite possibility. Galileo had had to "efface" his own identity in presenting the Medicean Stars to his patrons; Newton, in contrast, could become an authorial idol. Between, there occurred a change central to the construction of the modern investigator of nature. And at the turning-point lay Wilkins, Boyle and the Royal Society. The Society acknowledged royal patronage, yet, thanks in part to the monarch's personal absence from its deliberations, could bear to announce its members as individual gentlemen-authors. 13 By manipulating practices of reading, printing and publication it orchestrated new possibilities for scientific authorship. In the years of Ross's confrontation with Wilkins, however, the Royal Society did not yet exist, and Wilkins's claims to originality and identity were rather more circumspect. His books were published anonymously, and professed "modestly" to eschew such personal ambition. Nonetheless they declined to respect Ross's preferred arbiters of epistemic claims, namely the court and its scholastic readings of such authorities as Aristotle and Scripture. Ross, on the other hand, forged a prominent authorial identity for himself by ostentatious genuflection to these arbiters. Whether the "modest" autonomy of Wilkins or the conspicuous submission of Ross offered the better prospect of reconciling printed authorship with civic peace became central to their conflict. In this sense, the clash may thus be important not just to the history of science, but to that of authorship itself. It has been argued that the "earliest modern professional author" clawed his way into existence just as Wilkins and Ross were confronting each other.
14 Whether or not this claim is exactly warranted, an account of their confrontation can contribute to our understanding of the emergence of 'the' author in the early modern period. The nascent concept was subject to differing constructions, to which Ross and Wilkins gave voice. Their differences were significantly paradoxical. Ross, hard at work making for himself a reputation as the consummate bookseller's hack, loudly defended effacement; Wilkins, apparently a retiring and modest gentleman, endorsed independence and libertas philosophandi. Modern concepts of authorship were forged out of, and in response to, such incongruities. To understand them we need to pay full attention to contested representations of power, creativity and manners such as those articulated by Wilkins and Ross.
The political instability of 1640s England was a principal cause of this discomfiting fluidity in representations of authorship. The civil war destroyed a powerful source of conventions capable of governing such issues. Earlier, natural philosophical debates might have been played out in the setting of a royal court -a setting which created its own elaborate codes of authorial representation. 15 Ross himself was a staunch advocate of resolution of debate by submission to princely will. He began his attacks on Copernicans with the aim of entering just such a patronage regime, and continued to express his own subjection to it long after the collapse of any real courtly power in the land. As such, he found himself in an awkward position when he sought to establish himself as a writer in civil war London. There was no "public sphere" in his day, but his tracts must be sold to unknown and unknowable readers in a commercial capital city, not distributed among accredited gentlemen in the mannered circumstances of a court. Their actual judges would not be those which the tracts themselves represented as appropriate; Ross was left with no clear authority to which to submit. This realm needs to be at the forefront of our attention when examining his repudiation of authorial autonomy. Ross had now to work hard to create legitimacy for his own agonistic writings and their readership alike, while at the same time decrying the prospect of popular judgement and attempting to rebut his opponents' claims to a libertas philosophandi. Facing and overcoming this paradoxical problem required him to insist afresh upon the continuing authority of tradition, and to deploy sources in ways which reinforced their 'traditional' character. Ross consequently suggests the extent to which the use of such sources may be recognized as constructive and pointed. 16 Certainly, his own deployment of Aristotle and Scripture was designed to address the most current of controversies in what were, for England at least, unprecedented circumstances.
Ross was by no stretch of the historical imagination a 'modern'. Even Galen was too recent and reckless an innovator for him. Making him into a contributor to the scientific revolution would be a challenge beyond even the most radical revisionist. An initial task, then, is to account for his persistence in pursuing his antagonists so doggedly. We need to recover a world in which Ross's activities were not selfevidently absurd, at least to their perpetrator. This can be done by attending to two settings. The first is Marischal College in Aberdeen -an academy for argument, which employed resources ranging from calvinist Ramism to Jesuit neoAristotelianism in order to teach its own peculiar brand of religious controversialism. Here Ross underwent the peculiar formative experiences which conditioned him for his existence as a preacher and pedant. The second is the England of the 1630s. It was here, in the age of Charles I, William Laud and their ill-fated policy of "Thorough", that Ross first tried to put his Marischal training to use. THE ONE-MAN PANSOPHIA Alexander Ross was familiar with the consequences of discord. Born in Aberdeen on New Year's Day, 1591, he had been introduced to a dangerous and disordered world. Seven out of the last eight chief ministers of Scotland had died violently, the other had only survived by going into exile, and the country was in a state of almost perpetual civil war. Ross thus came to know better than most contemporary Englishmen the fragility of power which underlay, and arguably prompted, Stuart claims to divinely-sanctioned governance. In order to understand his concern for learning and political stability, one should begin with his experiences in Scotland.
The formative regime which fashioned him into a minister and pedagogue was of the same vintage as Ross himself. In the 1590s, Andrew Melville, an old student of Theodore Beza's who was leading the fight for presbytery in Scotland, made the creation of a learned presbyterian ministry central to his campaign for a secure Protestant social structure. 17 Melville therefore maintained that the office of teacher was of paramount importance. A pedagogue, he pronounced, was properly a "propheit, bischop, eldar, catechesar"; teachers ensured the continuance of the kirk itself. It was for this reason that Melville availed himself of the patronage of the Earl Marischal, to whom James VI had recently entrusted the "repressing of papists", to establish what became Marischal College in Aberdeen. The new college was to provide a godly education for future generations of polemicists and tutors. In Melville's own eyes that would necessitate a strictly Ramist approach, as best suited to argument and pedagogy. By the time Ross matriculated in about 1605, however, this original emphasis was already under challenge. The College's personnel by now largely consisted of pragmatic episcopalians, and their preferred curriculum was one of neo-scholastic Aristotelianism. The resulting juxtaposition of episcopacy and presbyterianism, Ramus and Aristotle, must have been fertile of violent disputes, especially in an institution founded specifically to create reformed crusaders. 18 Classroom crusaders, too: Ross certainly learned the major lesson of Marischal, that the pedagogue occupied the central role in fighting for an ordered godly realm. Since some of his university notebooks survive, it is also possible to report something about the substance of his studies there. The subjects were indeed heterogeneous, taking in not only Latin literature, human anatomy, and the Hebrew language, but also both neo-scholastic and Ramist lessons in logic. 19 Ross imbibed a paramount concern for ecclesiastical uniformity -"religion diuers not tolerated", as he concisely noted -and repudiated the vanity of what he learned to call "egoists". The Calvinist character of his uniform religion was stated clearly enough, but his teachers included episcopalians, who also taught him some highly unpuritan angelology. The culmination was reached in 1613, and was marked by a long essay on the creation and structure of the world. 20 The form of these notebooks may be as revealing as their content. They were not commonplace-books as such. But they did reproduce much of the piecemeal character of such personal compilations. Commonplace books -volumes in which discrete items of information from books, conversations or personal experience would be entered into an elementary organizational structure to be made available for use in subsequent teaching, writing and argument -had been a favourite tool of scholars and students since at least Erasmus. As Ann Blair argues, since the approach involved the parcelling of claims, argumentative snippets and quotations as discrete "factoids", their use tolerated a large degree of potential inconsistency between the many bits of knowledge so recorded. Blair suggests that because of this they became a principal factor permitting the perseverence of traditional ideas which, in less piecemeal juxtaposition, might have been brought into question. She also notes, however, that while permitting tolerance of disagreement in this sense, commonplace techniques also encouraged a certain kind of aggressive reading. A given text would be parsed into a sequence of discrete statements, each of which could then be more or less pointedly contrasted with already-collected items. Commonplaces could thus also give rise to blunt contradiction. Blair has demonstrated the salience of the technique through an examination of the work of Jean Bodin in late sixteenth-century France. But such flat contradition was also to become recognized as characteristic of the pedant. As we shall see, Ross's education conditioned him to become a regular proponent of such piecemeal tactics, and to similar polemical ends.
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Where he went after leaving Aberdeen we do not know: it may have been to the Orkney Islands.
22 At any rate, by 1616 Ross, like other Scots seeking their fortunes in the Jacobean realm, had emigrated southwards. In April he was appointed headmaster of a grammar school in Southampton. Almost immediately he began to find his duties onerous, however, and by 1620 the citizens were complaining of his negligence. He soon relinquished the post. Ross now began life as a preacher at St Mary's, a decrepit old church on the outskirts of the town. St Mary's was memorable only for the eucharistic chalice which Bishop Lancelot Andrewes provided for it: such an object denoted a high sacerdotalism. 23 But it was the prospect of ecclesiastical harmony which appealed to the new preacher in such ceremonialism, rather than the doctrinal denial of predestination which Andrewes was then pioneering and which Laud would soon inherit. In matters of grace he remained Calvinist, and he maintained that church fittings, music and ceremony were important for maintaining civil order rather than for their (dubious) divine efficacy. In politics he asserted that the "King of Britain" alone ruled by divine right -a pointed repudiation of the political claims of iure divino episcopacy now starting to be advanced. 24 Ever a polemicist, he promulgated these views forcefully by sermons and writing. His thoughts on predestination, at least, had some effect. Ross convinced the poet Henry Oxinden of his own election so successfully that Oxinden made haste to announce the good news to a lady correspondent: "I who am predestined to bee one of them, who shall judge the ANGELLS", he avowed, "have devoted my SELFE all the dayes of my appointed time to serve THEE". Sadly, her reaction to this rather startling approach is lost. 25 Ambitious, Ross now decided to seek favour at court. Venturing into the London Stationers' world, he began publishing. Three books of Rerum Iudaicarum memorabiliorum soon appeared (1617, 1619), followed by two more of Questions and answers upon Genesis (1620, 1622). He dedicated these to court figures such as Viscount Doncaster (a Scotsman, and a spectacularly profligate one-time favourite of James I), Francis Bacon, Lord Keeper Williams and Prince Charles. He was clearly trolling for patronage, and at length Ross got his reward, being appointed chaplain in ordinary to the king. In May 1622 he preached before Prince Charles on the theme of Melchisedec. It was a favourite subject for divine-right proponents and, as Ross told the prince, "a patterne of Christian kings". With the chance to establish a relationship with the future monarch, he was apparently on the route to preferment -perhaps even to a bishopric, for which a royal chaplaincy was increasingly a prerequisite. But Ross, a victim, perhaps, of his vestigial Calvinism, was left unpromoted. He remained in Southampton, where he laboured thanklessly to galvanize the new Caroline institutions of ecclesiastical discipline. 26 Further slight advancement would come only once, when he took advantage of the elevation of Laud to the Archbishopric of Canterbury by dedicating his Commentum de Terrae motu to the new primate. 27 He was rewarded with the additional reponsibility of Carisbrooke church on the Isle of Wight, a parish in the gift of the crown.
As the rewards of patronage went, this was slight indeed. Ross's ambition was not ridiculous, however, and his attempt to realize it was not altogether misconceived. Since March 1629 Charles I had called no Parliaments, and he would call no more until April 1640. In the mean time, he was mounting an effort to establish successful and harmonious governance without them. At the same time, Laud had launched an ambitious initiative to revive the powers of the clergy. Theologically, Laud stood for a rejection of the Calvinist tenet of double predestination, in favour of an elevated regard for the power of the eucharist to effect a state of grace. But it remains a matter of controversy whether his actions were really inspired by this novel commitment to "Arminianism", or by an altogether more prosaic concern for ecclesiastical order which can be traced back to the Elizabethan episcopate. Certainly, the restored church fabrics and formalized ceremonies which he championed were intended to represent on earth God's harmony and order. They were to "imprint" that image on the congregations which witnessed them, thus encouraging the recreation of such harmony in the sublunary realm. 28 It is this aspect of Caroline religion that makes Ross's efforts comprehensible. This is not the place for a reappraisal of Caroline political culture with respect to the history of science, although such a reappraisal is probably needed. Here only two related suggestions will be advanced: that the personal rule saw itself threatened by personal 'passions'; and that natural knowledge had a part to play in the representation of and response to those passions. These form part of a broader claim that dispute in general (and much else besides) was typically understood in terms of the passions, which were defined as a subject's physiological and psychological responses to external or internal stimuli. These entities seemed to stimulate both knowledge (through reason and disciplined curiosity) and error (through the imagination, or 'fancy', and unbounded curiosity). The discourse of the passions was thus widely distributed in early modern Europe, and accepted to be useful for comprehending a broad range of situations. Its printed record is extensive, amounting to a literature as large, perhaps, as that discussing civility. It was also omnivorous.
Authors discussing the passions helped themselves liberally to knowledge drawn from divinity, political theory, studies of the mind, anatomy and physiology, magic and commerce; and in turn they aspired to affect all of those fields. Questions of propriety in authorship, especially, were addressed in terms of the passions, as much as in terms of gentility -indeed, the two were not really separable, since definitions of the gentleman typically accounted him a man capable of restraining his passions. 29 It is well known that Laud announced "the cause of all our ills in church and state" to lie in improper and unauthorized aspirations to knowledge, and that these were grounded in misguided educational experiences. In 1630 he was made Chancellor of Oxford University, and moved to remedy the problem. 30 The University received a new set of Statutes, which were epitomized for students lest they should neglect any mandated aspect of behaviour. 31 For those students' conduct was to be strictly monitored. Like Laudian ecclesiology, Laudian university policy placed a high priority on the propriety of appearances. Academic dress and ritual were to be standardized, and thorough oversight of everyday deportment instituted. Laud himself received weekly reports on the execution of these measures. Its members thus disciplined, the University was to become an ideal commonwealth in microcosm, producing learned, virtuous and disciplined governors of a uniform church and state. 32 The impact of this new rigour on curricular content, let alone on natural philosophy, has been less than evident to historians. Students would continue to learn the predominantly neo-scholastic curriculum which had been instituted progressively since the 1590s. Yet in Europe Lutherans and Jesuits alike had shown that Aristotelianism could be reconstructed for original ends, and in England too William Harvey was demonstrating the extraordinary achievements which could thereby be produced. 33 It may be that the Aristotelianism of the 1630s should be appraised as similarly dynamic. 34 Certainly, Laud's revitalized Oxford printing house now published a number of neo-scholastic resources, including Bartholin's Anatomicae institutiones corporis humanae (1633), Burgersdijk's Idea philosophiae tum moralis, tum naturalis (1631 and 1637), Scheibler's Metaphysica (1637 and 1638, with a preface by Thomas Barlow warning of the dangers of heresy implicit in illegitimate speculation) and Philosophia compendiosa (1639), and Froidmont's Meteorologicorum libri sex (1639). The key question of how these works were put to use remains to be addressed by historians, and it was in such 'extra-statutory' practices that students found their most important lessons. 35 Nonetheless, it seems that Laud's energetic Oxford reforms endorsed a broadly scholastic (and certainly patristic) enterprise. If so, then Ross's apparently archaic arguments may in fact have been rather opportune.
The suggestion obtains symbolic support from the display that the University created to celebrate Charles's ratification of the new Statutes. Such occasions were widely recognized as important statements of court policy and intent. This one articulated a simple and emphatic account of the purposes of such measures as Laud's, and the consequences should they fail. Entitled The passions calmed, it has a good claim to be recognized as the New Atlantis of Laudianism. 36 Briefly, a wise and learned monarch named Prudentius is driven into exile, and replaced by Queen Fancy. Fancy immediately calls for flying machines to be built, along with a range of similarly wild magical devices. She wishes, she says, to "new fashion Nature". The result is that before long every subject is proclaiming him-or herself a source of knowledge -a "Dunces Teacher". The inevitable outcome is anarchy. Eventually, Fancy sees that her downfall is the result of her subjects' faculties running out of control. "The passions taking advantage of my Law, Follow their humours to their mutual ruine", she wails, as Prudentius is restored in the nick of time.
The subject of this performance was governance, both of the body and of the realm. It presented a "Model of self-policy", from which "We find what use [is] Outward Soveraignty". 37 Strode displayed how disorder in the state came about because of failure to restrain the passions. He composed an elemental polarity between "Prudence" and "Fancy", where the former stood for peace, knowledge, and a stable Creation, and the latter for confusion, error and magic. These termsespecially "Fancy" and "the passions" -were familiar and conventional. They referred to the imagination, and to its role in determining a wide range of physiological and mental responses to stimuli. Physicans and ministers dealt with these concepts every day in their efforts to rein in the body's physical and moral disorders. It is also the case that the perceived efficacy of Laud's ecclesiology was often explained in terms of such conventional representations: it was only "while we live [d] in the body", Laud conceded, that we needed such "external helps". And this was also why the University was to be subjected to the disciplining of manners characterized by Strode as "outward sovereignty". But the message here was that not only could sedition derive from, and in turn encourage, such "voluntary" errors as alchemy; in a deeper sense both could spring from personal pathologies. In this sense, Ross's emphases on "fancy" and "imagination" as characteristic of his opponents were again well-judged. He made his exchange with Wilkins into a rematch, but in a very different arena, of Strode's struggle between Prudence and Fancy. 38 If sedition sprang from pathology, then Laud's educational reforms may be seen as aimed at creating a subject resistant to such conditions. A number of examples could be cited, but the sort of learned man Laud wished to produce by such devices was perhaps best represented by his own personal chaplain, Peter Heylyn. 39 Heylyn devoted decades to completing his own great work of natural and historical knowledge entitled Microcosmus (later Cosmographie). 40 Whilst historians of science have been more interested in a rather different kind of practitioner, that dedicated to what contemporaries called "the mathematicalls", there is evidence that the investment of credit in a man like Heylyn came rather easier to the court. When claimants to the longitude came forward, for example, the Privy Council delegated the task, not to Gresham College, but to the mathematically unskilled Heylyn. It was on his verdict alone, he was told, that "the credibility of the phaenomenon" rested. 41 Moreover, Heylyn became an accredited arbiter of books as well as phenomena. He was engaged by Laud to appraise newly-published works. Heylyn adopted a radically interventionist practice of reading these targeted works. It involved the identification of discrete objectionable statements within a given argument, which could then be listed seriatim before being refuted one by one and then re-assembled into a damning whole. There was a history to such a role: Grafton and Jardine have identified Gabriel Harvey as such an employed reader in the late sixteenth century. 42 But the purposes to which Heylyn's readings were put were more pointed and polemical than Harvey's, and their consequences were greater. In 1633-34, to pick an especially important example, it was Heylyn who was entrusted to make seven "collections" of scandalous passages from the thousand pages of William Prynne's attack on stagecraft, Histriomastix, "reduce them into method", and provide Laud with ten devastating points to use as ammunition against Prynne in his fateful trial at Star Chamber. Puritan opponents of such "interpreting" procedures objected that, by following this practice, Heylyn could "transubstantiate" (the terminology was obviously pejorative) any book into a "libel". 43 For Heylyn, what authorized such a reading practice was his fear of the uses to which a disordered urban readership could put a given text. Ross shared both the fear and the response. But in 1641, as the political nation disintegrated, those fears were suddenly realized. Like Ross, the Mayor and elders of Southampton wanted to side with the king. The citizens thought otherwise, however, and popular resentment soon impinged on Laud's local representative. Ross confronted the "new upstart Sectaries" from his pulpit. Returning to a favourite theme of earlier harangues, he reaffirmed the propriety of ceremonial, declaiming against "furious Pharisees" who offended against what he called, in Laud's famous phrase, "the beauty of holinesse". 44 This was hardly calculated to appeal at the time of the Root and Branch riots, and Ross's unpopularity deepened. Some parishioners denounced him as an extortioner, others as a papist. He retaliated by mounting a second attack on the "theeves" desecrating the church's "beautie" and its "altar". Developing another characteristic strategy, Ross now articulated a comprehensive historical and conceptual taxonomy of heresies to which they had fallen prey. These included "Faction", idolatry, papism and what Ross called "Libertinisme", by which he meant the disease of one who "will be subject to no order nor discipline, but what pleaseth his owne phansie". Modern schismatics might proclaim an historical pedigree for their views, but in reality all should be traced from the archetypal magician and heresiarch, Simon Magus. From the outset, Ross insisted, corruption had festered in the interpretation of both Scripture and nature, until it had reached its apogee in the appropriately decayed setting of St Mary's. His point made, he left his pulpit for the last time, relinquished the field to his enemies, and took the road for London. 45 The city he now entered was witnessing a ferment of natural knowledge as well as of politics. As Cambridge Platonist Ralph Cudworth was to tell the House of Commons in March 1647, there had been "much enquiry concerning knowledge in these latter times.... The sonnes of Adam are now as busie as ever himself was, about the Tree of Knowledge of good and evil, shaking the boughs of it, and scrambling for the fruit." 46 As Charles Webster established in The Great Instauration, enterprises aiming at the reformation of such knowledge blossomed in the 1640s and '50s. Cudworth's sermon constituted an appeal for support for such projects, and after hearing it the Commons voted their principal champion, Samuel Hartlib, a post at Oxford. 47 It came to nothing; Hartlib never got his Fellowship, and his partner in pansophia, Comenius, departed for the Continent. But the willingness of Parliament to countenance such backing testifies to the importance of his proposals at what was becoming a turning-point in the history of both science and politics. Amidst this turmoil, Ross became a private tutor and began to write polemics in earnest. It was only now that his output of such tracts became prodigious. It might have been even more so: only a catastrophic fire, it was said, prevented him from adding to the list more than three hundred of his sermons.
Why did Ross write so much? Some, at least, of his many books seem to have been well-received, but he did not achieve wide acclaim, and to modern eyes consistency of argument is not their most obvious virtue. Nor do his dedications reveal success in obtaining patronage as a consistent motor: he certainly failed to achieve it, and with the collapse of the personal rule the major likely source of such preferment had been cut off. The likelihood is that the meaning of such conventional representations in the mid-1640s was not what it had been a decade earlier. Ross had now found himself in a different cultural world. He was being paid by booksellers to produce these tracts on controversial topics, and it is to the relation between schoolmaster and Stationer that one should look to explain his outpourings. Contemporary readers did just this. His own pupil, for one, found Ross fonder of lucre than he thought fitting for a divine. Richard Whitlocke, too, reckoned that it was because "the Spirit of contradiction prove [d] saleable" that booksellers engaged him to write against all proponents of original or unusual notions, "sparing neither Bacons, Harveys, Digbys, Brownes, or any the like". And Francis Osborne singled out Ross to exemplify the primacy of Stationers in structuring public discourse. Osborne alleged that, "in envy to those of their own Trade", booksellers would "incourage, if not hire ... Blasphemers against the Spirit of Knowledge", whose books were rendered saleable by the "names they pretend in their Title-page to confute". This, Osborne thought, was now "the Trade of Al. Ro [ss] ".
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The nature of these allegations deserves to be noted. Ross's arguments were now being composed, produced, circulated and read in a world conditioned by the cultural practices of the London book trade, albeit that he himself represented them as arbitrated by central authorities of church and state. The publishers who actually undertook his tracts varied, but they included Richard Royston and Miles Flesher -men well-known to be engaged political participants. During the civil war both Royston and Flesher became pronounced royalists, Royston in particular dedicating himself wholeheartedly to the cause. 49 It is not now possible to describe the detailed negotiations with these agents of which Ross's printed books are the material relics. Such negotiations generally took place orally, on a face-to-face basis, and the records even of those which did not have often disappeared. But it is possible to describe the general characteristics attributed by contemporaries to this kind of relationship, and the representations of authorship to which they gave rise.
The book trades in London were the province of men and women called "Stationers", who were members of a single organization, the Stationers' Company. 50 The Company had been chartered by Queen Mary in the mid-sixteenth century, and had built up a sophisticated and, by and large, successful civility of its own. This included a registration regime to prevent the unauthorized reprinting of works. The register did help to guard against piracy. But it did so by establishing perpetual rights in the books it so protected, not in their writers, but in the Stationers who sponsored them. In the event of controversy, the Company then had its own private court empowered to investigate and order appropriate compensatory actions. Its customs were shrouded in the confidentiality which gentlemen routinely abhorred in merchants and craftsmen. In short, authorship was created by these printers and booksellers, not just through their mastery of the press, but also through their dominance of these cultural practices. Contemporary readers were as a result accustomed to appraising the content of the printed books they encountered by what they knew of the characters of their publishing Stationers, and of their trade in general. They recognized Stationers as dedicated individuals, licensed by their community to intervene in the form and even content of the works they produced. This was the reality underpinning the frequent and familiar complaints by scholars and gentlemen alike that the realm of print was one dominated by mysterious and mercenary tradesmen. This was why, as George Wither famously put it, "The Schollers Purgatory" was "Discovered In the Stationers Common wealth". 51 The implications for a gentleman were only exacerbated by the practices of the printing house itself. This was a place where virtue and commerce converged, and had to unite in one person. In becoming an author, a prudent man had to exercise pedantry, and a pedant had to show prudence. On the one hand, nonchalance was scarcely the appropriate attitude to strike when confronted with the disciplines of proof-reading and correction, and gentlemen very often complained of their forced subservience to such rigours. On the other, Stationers were not mere servants. They were locally powerful, and negotiations with them had to be conducted with delicacy and forbearance. The representation of the Stationer as dominant thus further threatened the compatibility of gentility with authorship. It warranted a widespread fear that in venturing into print, a writer must sacrifice the personal freedom of action which was regarded as so central to the being of a gentleman. Such a fear encouraged claims that printed authorship was not quite a polite endeavour -especially when combined with the fact that the permanence of print threatened to fossilize the writer's subservience for posterity. The result was manifested in microcosm in attacks on Ross. Those attacks took the form of questioning his integrity and liberty as creator of his works, and asserting the power of his booksellers over him. He was represented as not his own man, but the Stationers' creature: not so much the first author as the first hack.
The "Stationers' Commonwealth" was thus a cultural setting widely perceived as mercenary and at best amoral. One consequence was that Ross was vilified as a scribbler. Another was that he himself reacted to works of natural knowledge, not as the thoughts of ivory-towered scholars, but as elements in a clamorous culture of pamphlets, libels and broadsides. There would be "danger in reading" such materials, as he affirmed of more than one such piece. 52 So Ross read philosophy much as Heylyn read puritan polemic: piecemeal, and with a view to aggressive confrontation. Commonplacing came in very useful for such purposes. Putting into operation a debasement of the machineries of argument he had learnt at Aberdeen, he tore these sentences out of context and rebutted them one by one with resolute perseverance. He read so as to construct consistencies, both across different "libels" which we now might not class together, and across paragraphs within those volumes which we now might class as discrete, yet at the same time he would have little regard for what we would regard as a work's line of argument. This was the way of reading which Ross extended to Wilkins's Discovery and Discourse.
It was in this context, then, that Ross finally found his vocation. For the first time, his pedantry could be put to unrestrained use in the form of authorship. It was here that he donned the responsibility of answering all whom he perceived to threaten safe knowledge, in a sequence of works paralleling those of the best natural philosophers of the time. The royalist poet Edward Benlowes expressed the point of his activity when, comparing Ross to the grand projects of Hartlib and the Comenians, he asked simply: "What's Pansophie? Why, thou art it." 53 
THE PASSIONS UNBOUND: THE PERILS OF SINGULARITY
The best-known of Ross's many conflicts was his exchange with the proponents of Copernicanism, and in particular with the young John Wilkins. It began at the moment when Laud attained his ascendancy, in the mid-1630s. Since it ended only in 1646, the year after Laud's execution for high treason, it spanned the triumph and demise of Ross's chosen polity.
The beginning of the controversy may be understood in terms of contemporary patronage strategies. Ross took advantage of an opportunity which arose out of a conjunction of Continental and English events. In Rome, Galileo had prompted condemnation of Copernicanism in 1616 and was in the process of doing so again. Philip van Lansberg (1561-1632), astronomer and Protestant minister in Middelburg, had responded to the 1616 announcement by proclaiming heliocentrism and adopting Kepler's defence of the claims of mathematicians to elucidate philosophically the working of providence in Creation. 54 Assuming a recognized Calvinist stance, Lansberg had roundly denounced as "preposterous" the assumption that such principles of astronomy could be decided by reference to Holy Writ, "for in no wise did the Spirit, the Author of Holy Scripture, wish to convey the fundamentals of these arts". He had immediately linked this to disciplinary hierarchy, urging that "things having regard to astronomy must be evaluated not out of Holy Scripture, but by astronomy itself ", and citing in confirmation Lactantius's unfortunate declaration "against the astronomers" that the Antipodes could not exist. In response, Libert Froidmont (Libertus Fromondus), Catholic professor of philosophy at the University of Louvain in the Spanish Netherlands, had defended the condemnation. Froidmont took seriously the language of the 1616 declaration against "false Pythagorean doctrine". He apparently believed that radical heretics since Wycliff and Huss had dedicated themselves to resurrecting an ancient Epicurean atheism, and had now grafted the Pythagorean notion of a moving Earth onto their creed to create a particularly dangerous new sect of what he called "Pythagorico-Copernicans". Aristotelian theory, experiential evidence and scriptural exegesis were all to be brought to bear against this "Copernican theology", along with liberal doses of ad hominem abuse. For good measure, Froidmont had identified his efforts with Marin Mersenne's simultaneous assault on the "physical, or chymical (insofar as Hermetic) earth" promoted by "melancholics, Paracelsists and Fluddists". He had thus nominated Lansberg a chemical philosopher as well as an astronomer. Any claim to independence from Scripture such as his could only be a device to create an intellectual space in which to deploy their heretical arguments. 55 In arguing this, Froidmont both made the religious politics of Copernicans a prominent theme, and provided a model for their repudiation.
John Pell apparently translated Lansberg into English in 1634, although no copy seems to survive. 56 In any case, the argument provided a clear opportunity for Ross to angle for Laud's patronage by displaying his engagement with European intellectual debates. In case this were not close enough to home, however, he also found a domestic target. This was the robustly Calvinist Nathaniel Carpenter, erstwhile Fellow of Exeter College, Oxford, and a notable victim of Laud's vigour. Four years earlier, Carpenter's Achitophel: or, the picture of a wicked politician, the text of three sermons describing treacherous counsellors who created a "pretence of Religion" while surreptitiously "setting up a new Idolatry", had been called in. It had alleged that Arminian soteriology illegitimately neglected providence in effectively denying that "the actions and counsels of men [were] preordained". But Carpenter also argued that Aristotelians treated nature as Laudians treated ritual: as if it could "worke of its owne accord". The scholastic natural philosophy restored at Oxford was to be repudiated, then, for the same providential reason as Laudian concepts of grace. Carpenter's response was to argue for a different, more actively providential, Creation. This Creation incorporated the diurnal rotation of the Earth -a motion he explained as driven by the constant intervention of the deity in the form of a magnetic agency similar to that described by William Gilbert in his enormously influential De magnete. Ignored, Carpenter had left his Fellowship in frustration at the impossibility of gaining advancement, and had ended his days as chaplain to Archbishop Ussher in Armagh. But his Geography delineated, articulating a rival mathematical and magnetic cosmology, presented a ready target for a would-be philosophical warrior living outside the university but ambitious to establish his own name before powerful ecclesiastical patrons. 57 The third element in the conjuncture was the elevation of the most dynamic of those patrons, Laud. It was rumoured that he had been promised the primacy years earlier by Charles, and Carpenter, for one, had felt his influence long before; but this was the moment when his power reached its peak. Ross thus chose this moment to enter the lists against Carpenter and Lansberg, dedicating his Commentum de terrae motu circulari to Laud at the moment of his elevation to the Archbishopric. To Ross, the significance of the appointment was not so much theological as moral. Laud's prime attribute -under Charles's command -was as the fount of personal and social order. Ross was thus offering him this tract, which dispatched the "Pythagorean monster" of the Earth's motion "more by your authority than by my arguments", as a contribution to his greater disciplining project. 58 The subsequent text made the supporter of the Earth's motion into a prophet of sectarian "delirium". It derided Copernicanism as a Froidmontian cluster of "Pythagorean Chimaeras", adumbrating the same sort of historical descent of errors with which Ross would later regale Southampton rioters. (It is worth observing that this may well have been the work's original title: its running-head was Chymaerae Pythagoricae, and Ross himself referred to the book by this name.) 59 More broadly, Ross maintained that to advocate a new cosmology was to create conceptual and rhetorical latitude for dangerous dissent. Here it threatened to raise the status of "magic, and judicial astrology" to the point where it would seem equivalent to that of established religion. Heterodoxy, disorder and the advocacy of false natural knowledge, as he told his Southampton parishioners, went together. 60 Ross's Commentum attracted little attention. Abroad, it received a few private and dismissive comments from Gassendi; in England itself it made no discernible impact, and did not generate substantial preferment for its writer. Why not? The obvious reason is that Ross was no English Galileo. He offered no spectacle to attract courtly attention, and little civility to hold it. In an age of city arches celebrating monarchical cosmologies, masques displaying royal heavens, and university verses trumpeting Charles I's ability to square the circle by producing a fourth child, Ross's turgid and laborious refutation was simply not possessed of enough basilical and cosmological flair to succeed with its intended readership. 61 Indeed, it explicitly spurned the vaunting of new phenomena, and repudiated the seductions of epideictic rhetoric in favour of seriatim rebuttal by commonplace. In addition, it had no broker prepared to boost its fortunes with key patrons. We have no evidence that they even read it. Ross was lucky to get his Carisbrooke reward, and retreated for the rest of Laud's tenure into relative obscurity. 62 The first remarkable thing about the subsequent dispute is thus that it occurred at all. The second is that Ross was for once not the perpetrator of an attack, but its victim. In 1638 the notorious presbyterian bookseller Michael Sparke, William Prynne's friend and ally (and the creator of Prynne's public identity as the figurehead of presbyterianism), issued a small anonymous book entitled The discovery of a world in the Moone. The unknown writer of Sparke's pamphlet, John Wilkins, was at this time far from the prominent churchman and virtuoso he was later to become. Wilkins was twenty-four years old, the son of a goldsmith and grandson of a famous puritan divine. He had attended Oxford University since 1627, where his college had been one of the last to remain stubbornly constant to Calvinism. It was there, in his years as a tutor, that he had written most of his Discovery. But Wilkins, like Carpenter, had left Oxford rather than subject himself to the Laudian statutes. He had become chaplain to William Fiennes, Viscount Saye and Sele -one of very few peers explicit in their opposition to the initiatives of the personal rule, and a man whom Clarendon was to condemn as "the oracle of those who were called Puritans in the worst sense". 63 He was in this position when Sparke issued his tract. What would a contemporary reader have made of this tract? A certain degree of speculation is necessary. The book, as already observed, was anonymous. But that did not mean it was without authorial associations. The name boasted on its title page -the name by which readers, aware of Stationers' customs, would assess its purpose and allegiance -was that of Michael Sparke. 64 It was not an unknown one. From the 1620s through to his death in 1653, Sparke almost single-handedly created what one might call "the business of puritanism". 65 He published not only the vast majority of William Prynne's works, but Carpenter's too. He also produced his own compositions: his Crums of comfort was among the most successful of all seventeenth-century popular devotional pieces, tens of thousands of copies being printed. Above all, he was recognized, certainly by Charles's Privy Council and in all probability by London lay readers too, as endorsing the views of the Presbyterians whose reputations he so substantially created. Sparke himself declared publicly that he thought Prynne's work a "iust and necessary defence of the auncient & established Doctrine of the Church of England ag t. the Arminians", and he would later approve Laud's demise equally publicly. Books undertaken by Sparke were thus readily identified by their readers with opposition to Laud's "innovations". Since The discovery appeared at the very peak of his notoriety, it is perhaps unsurprising that there is evidence that it was indeed read in this spirit. Cavalier poets like John Collop associated the writer with "Lunaticks", and Sir John Suckling implied that he must support the Scots in the Bishops' Wars. 66 Sparke's anonymous writer had already foreseen this possibility, however, and had moved to address it. As he admitted, "that prejudice which the meere title of the booke may beget cannot easily be removed". Part of his response was rhetorical. He declared an intention to reach readers able to disregard such associations, who must be "indifferently resolved to assent unto that truth which upon deliberation shall seeme most probable unto [their] reason". They must accept that the knowledge presented was not "exact" or "accurate", and that his arguments were "probable" rather than "undeniable"; nonetheless, they should accept that his suggestion deserved consideration. But real instantiations of such ideal readers were rare, as he fully acknowledged. "Common opinion" was likely to be against him. That was why his work was, as its licenser classified it, a "paradox": it advocated a truth which common opinion decreed absurd. He forecast that he would be accused of "bold ostentation" for venturing to speak it -so much so that Wilkins had, he claimed, hesitated to publish at all "for feare of being counted singular and ridiculous". 67 Two years later The discovery was reprinted in a changed and extended version, along with a new text entitled A discourse concerning a new planet. Tending to prove, that 'tis probable our Earth is one of the planets. This new version was still anonymous, but it had been altered to meet criticisms. Its title page, for example, lacked the previous impression's overtones. The work was issued not by Sparke, but by John Maynard, a Stationer who was himself an almost anonymous figureapart from this, the only book he ever published was Edward Reynolds's calvinist account of the eucharist, Meditations on the Holy Sacrament (1638). 68 The work within carried licences from both Oxford and London. The longest addition to the text itself was a discussion of possible methods of reaching the new world in the Moon, but other amendments were made throughout which had the effect of bolstering its case in key respects. They included both more, and more explicit, citation of ancient and modern authorities in support of the idea of a world in the Moon. Important arguments concerning the intended meaning and readership of Scripture were likewise amplified significantly. The 1640 text was thus unambiguous in its denial that the ancient Jews had been skilled astronomers -a point not advanced in the earlier version, and which made much more emphatic the refusal of astronomical authority to Old Testament prophets and their modern exegetes alike. Similarly, it was only in 1640 that explicit mention was made of Calvin's principle of accommodation, according to which the Holy Spirit had written the Old Testament in terms appropriate to the understandings of the vulgar. 69 By contrast, Wilkins added an argument that Galileo's telescope effectively brought the observer closer to the heavens, and thereby made that observer a "fitter Judge" of their nature than the Earth-bound Aristotelian philosopher or exegete. 70 In general, references to Kepler, Galileo and others were extended and made much more specific: in 1638, Wilkins had not actually read some of their more relevant works. He also now cited Kepler in support of the notion that publishing strange truths need not derive from vanity, uncouth jesting, or a "humor of contradiction". This was made into powerful support for his earlier denial of the charge of "singularity". 71 If one may infer the kind of criticisms which had been made of the 1638 impression from these changes, then those criticisms were indeed of a bookish, even Rossian character. Such an inference is supported by the Discourse concerning a new planet. The Discourse extended Wilkins's argument into a fully Copernican cosmology. It also launched his attack on Ross. It did so not just because Ross espoused wrong views about Creation, but because he himself exemplified unsound conduct in arguments of this kind, and even dangerous conduct in civil and religious matters. In other words, a central purpose of the Discourse was to make Ross into the representative of a certain kind of person -the kind who generated discord by too strenuous an assertion of certainty. Wilkins's probabilistic response was designed to distinguish himself from such a type, thereby delineating a modest yet authorial persona. 72 The need to avoid being accounted "singular" thus recurred at the outset of the Discourse, and continued to resound throughout the tract. The term warrants brief examination. It seems to have carried a particular meaning, and not just for Wilkins.
According to his contemporaries, "singular" writers were those who set themselves up as alternative authorities, claiming to produce knowledge beyond the purview of church and state. They were suddenly springing up everywhere, producing what Wilkins called "those multitudes of Pamphlets which are every day prest into the World". 73 The problem was that a "singular" author produced not knowledge, but passionate "fancy". That is, by asserting individual authority such a writer fell foul of the insurmountable postlapsarian corruption of human reason by the body, denoted, in the warnings of monarchs, sermonizers and physicians alike, by the passions. This was the outcome against which Strode, Carew and others had warned.
"Singularity" may thus be understood as a political term: it meant the subjection of the community to its corporeal passions, as concentrated in an individual. Should it be allowed to persist, Strode's island would begin to float again. With the descent into Civil War, this seemed about to happen. "Singularity" now became a widelyapplied term of social and epistemological analysis, even of abuse. By 1638, the year of The discovery, Henry Peacham was already warning that in their unseemly ambition would-be authors displayed "superlative singularity". By the 1650s, Henry More would be urging "a perfect Privation of all desire of singularity" as the best cure for enthusiasm; such submission, he would insist, was essential for anyone wanting to create knowledge. Meric Casaubon agreed. Thomas Hobbes, too, defined heresy as "singularity of doctrine or opinion". And at the Restoration George Lawson began his Politica sacra et civilis by declaring that "it was not out of singularity, or a humour of opposition" that he had penned the work. 74 Each of these men identified the force against which they were fighting to be "singular" because it was founded in the misconceptions generated by an individual's unrestrained passions.
To assert originality while avoiding this charge was a central problem for natural philosophers. Carpenter had experienced it, up to a point. He had responded by appropriating the continental notion of libertas philosophandi to insist upon his own "Philosophical Liberty" to propose claims at variance with the knowledge espoused by received authorities. 75 Wilkins, too, had to distance himself from "singularity" while maintaining the validity of proposing new knowledge. He squared this circle by insisting, like Carpenter, on the duty "alwaies to preserve a Philosophicall liberty" and not to become "inslaved to the opinion of any man". In Wilkins's case, however, this was defined as a liberty, not to insist upon new conclusions just as definitive as those replaced (which would itself be "singular"), but merely to "suspend" one's assent. To appear safe and creditable, a writer must display hesitancy in proposing arguments and shun belligerence in asserting them, along with adopting similar conventions of what Wilkins called "modesty". One would then avoid the "boldness" which was always a sign of singularity. Modesty, it seemed, could hold the commonweal together by distinguishing originality from obduracy.
To make this point, Wilkins needed a figure whom he could identify as exemplifying the linked elements of inappropriate pugnacity, dangerous pride and error which together signalled true singularity. He found such a figure in Alexander Ross. He attacked Ross, then, not just as the proponent of a mistaken cosmology, but as a convincing representative of dangerous and misguided conduct. To do so he reminded readers in his prefatory address that the aim of his own work was not victory but peace. Its argument was not logically compelling, and was "not maintained with such heate and religion, as if every one that reads it, were presently bound to yeeld up his assent". Indeed, readers inevitably had many different ways of "apprehending things", and hence "their Understandings are severally fashioned to different assents". That Ross had not appreciated the plural nature of assent was the root of his violence in asserting his own views as compelling submission. He was representative of a kind of opponent, pugnacious because he misunderstood the nature and variety of agreement itself.
More specifically, Ross had maintained that "it must needs argue a strong affectation of Singularitie, for a man to take up any groundlesse fancy against such antient and generall Authority". To this Wilkins responded in two ways. The first rested on what may be recognized as a central aspect of gentility. His own professed "Philosophicall liberty" was, he claimed, necessary if one were not to be "inslaved" to existing opinions. Freedom of action, a definitive quality of the gentleman, would be compromised by such slavery. It was thus appropriate to "labour to find out what things are in themselves by our owne experience", and if this did lead to novel claims, it would be "Not our fault, because it did not arise from Singularity or Affectation". 76 Wilkins attested that even Aristotle thought such liberty "do's deserve rather to be stiled by the name of Modestie, than Boldnes". The second response returned to Wilkins's restriction of adjudicatory competence to the skilled community of astronomers. Regardless of other communities, he argued, so many astronomers now adhered to Copernicanism that "it is a greater Argument of Singularitie to oppose it". In short, Ross was now the "singular" author. This quality encapsulated in one term his "conceit" for his own ideas, his "servile and superstitious" attitude to ancient authorities, his slavery to "sense" rather than "discourse and reason", his pugnacity, and his demand for absolute submission. Ross represented in one writer the "captious" ideal. This captiousness, it should be noted, also drove him directly to absurd Scriptural and natural statements which otherwise even he would not have defended. 77 His false cosmology and his violence were therefore mutually dependent aspects of the one whole. Wilkins answered the former not for its intrinsic worth, but for the manner of its deployment -"because this Author do's proceed in his whole discourse with so much scorne and triumph". He had made Ross into the true pedant, in the pejorative as well as the literal sense. 78 Yet Wilkins did not reject altogether the sources of Ross's professed knowledge. In particular, he reappropriated two of the most important: Scriptural and classical authorities. He did not assert in contrast to Ross that anyone could be a proper author. Only certain members of society were qualified. This was stated most clearly in his account of providence -a concept which lay at the centre of reformed religion. Wilkins insisted that one must be a qualified interpreter, whether of Scripture or Nature, to construe providence safely. By qualification, he meant skill in the mathematical sciences and natural philosophy. God had pointedly shown the prophet Job, for example, "how unfit he was to judge of the wayes of Providence" because he was not a natural philosopher. In fact, the purpose of doing natural philosophy was to understand the ways of providence. A philosopher's role was precisely to show "what according to the usuall way of Providence, is most likely to be done". And this was another reason why the Bible should be recognized as non-committal on erudite matters of natural knowledge. To rely on such authorities would effectively be to "bring Scripture to patronize any fancy of our owne", since exegesis was such a litigious activity. The Holy Spirit had not recorded erroneous natural philosophy in Scripture, for example -as, in Ross's readings, it seemed to have done. To suggest as much immediately implied "a strong affectation of Singularity". 79 And one must distance oneself equally from those who applied laboured readings of Scripture to decipher the order of nature, such as the "Rabbies" and "Chymicks" -a point which was added to The discovery in 1640, and reinforced in the Discourse. There was thus a sense in which Wilkins was addressing the practices of reading and citation as much as natural knowledge (and he directly accused Ross of inappropriate citation practices, in particular plagiary, to drive home the point). But it was also this risk of idolizing one's "fancy" which set limits on natural speculation. Wilkins refused to guess at the nature of any lunar inhabitants, for example, since doing so implied yielding to his own "fancy". Nonetheless, his account of how one might get to the Moon sounded uncomfortably like the projects of Strode's Queen Fancy. A pamphleteer was to joke that Wilkins had actually been asked to build one of his sky-chariots for the use of the Interregnum state. 80 Like Ross, too, Wilkins created a history of authorities for his ideas. It was essential to do so, again, lest "this opinion ... be suspected of singularity", and even condemned as "the prejudice ... of an upstart fancie". He thus set out to show that his view "hath beene the direct opinion of many ancient with some moderne Mathematicians" -and not, significantly, theologians. His patrons were Orpheus, Xenophanes, Anaxagoras, Democritus, Heraclitus, and above all Pythagoras and his followers. More recent sponsors included Nicholas of Cusa, Giordano Bruno, the atomist Nicholas Hill, Michael Maestlin and Johannes Kepler. Above all, there was Galileo. To modern historians it seems an heroic descent. To Ross it would not. 81 These arguments, however, were primarily negative. They served what Wilkins defined as "the chiefe purpose of the present Treatise; namely, the removall of those common prejudices that men usually entertain against this opinion". His positive physical arguments for Copernicanism were not of the same kind. They were based around five "Diagrams": figures displaying the harmony of the system, and its ability readily to explain such phenomena as the retrogression of the planets. 82 Wilkins then ended these positive arguments with a hymn of praise to astronomy itself, which exhorted readers to devote themselves to the study of the heavens for three reasons. First, it encouraged the contemplation of God and His providence. Secondly, it distracted attention from worldly affairs, and reminded the student of their lack of consequence. And thirdly, its conclusions were certain -"as infallible as truth it self". "Onely those who want skill in the Principles of this Science", he declared, "mistrust the conclusions of it". 83 Ross's reply to this attack was registered at Stationers' Hall almost immediately. But it did not finally appear in print until 1646, presumably because of the disruption caused to the book trade by the Civil War. 84 When it was published, much of it was devoted to deriding Wilkins's professions of "modesty". Ross found these preposterous, especially given that Wilkins had published anonymously. What greater sign of both cowardice and an aspiration to singularity could there be? Only those "intelligent, judicious, learned, and thoroughly grounded in piety", he warned, could be trusted to read such a work "without danger". 85 While his own tracts, properly dedicated and directed, would reach such an audience, Sparke's and Maynard's would not. This new production therefore represented not just questionable cosmology, but a more general threat to peace. This was why the expression of Copernicanism should not be tolerated even when attended by Wilkins's protestations of hesitancy. Ross insisted that "the world is pestered with too many opinions already" for its publication to be harmless. Wilkins had abjured association with the exploding phenomenon of pamphleteering; Ross embraced it. He readily identified Wilkins's "scribling" with the many libels being created in the London he discovered when he arrived as a refugee from Southampton. In this world, what Wilkins lauded as "Philosophicall libertie" was not liberty at all, but licence. It was no more than a "loosing of the reines to exorbitant wits, to run headlong into every kinde of absurdity".
In such a realm, Wilkins's professed emancipation would in practice become a worse slavery than any adherence to the Fathers, and for a simple reason. Wilkins had been both circumspect and strict about who should finally judge between competing opinions. He had denied the right to common people, "for they judge by their senses", and he had refused to allow it to the Fathers, who were "ignorant" of such matters. "Who then will you name for Judges", Ross demanded, "seeing Scriptures, Fathers, senses, Peripateticks, are rejected.... I think you must be faine to call for some of your people out of the Moon." With no judges to resolve such matters, any self-appointed author could adhere to his or her singular opinions, and attempt to force their effects on others. Far from embracing freedom of opinion, in practice Wilkins's reserve ratified enslavement to the fancy. 86 Yet Wilkins had, of course, suggested some qualifications for proper judges. He had asserted that they should be astronomers or mathematically-literate natural philosophers. He had lauded the certainty attainable in their studies. But Ross responded by pointing to the continuing conflicts dividing astronomers. Theirs, he concluded, was largely a "phantasticall" enterprise: that is, it was defined by the fancy. Practitioners both ancient and modern created mere "toyes and fictions", constructing "confused Babels of their owne conceits". Their products were not certain knowledge at all, but "opinion", as was demonstrated by their fierce and never-ending controversies. So Ross pounced on Wilkins's final representation of astronomy as a realm of certainty, free from earthly quarrels. Astronomers argued over everything, Ross responded; their theories rested on nothing so much as "conjectures and uncertainty". Indeed, Wilkins's own book had contained "nothing but suppositions, may-bee's, conjectures, and uncertainties". What Wilkins had represented as a model of polite hesitancy was in Ross's eyes an exemplar of contention. 87 And the passionate character of his professed solution was confirmed by the fact that Wilkins had relied so extensively on "figures and characters" for his positive arguments. These were appeals to the imagination and its passions, not to reason. They "more affect the eye then satisfie the minde", Ross insisted. He bluntly told Wilkins that "Not the Sunnes appearances but your phantasies are to be seene by your figures". 88 This meant above all that natural philosophers and mathematicians should not be permitted to pronounce on matters of providence. "Doubtlesse Job was not ignorant but modest", Ross told Wilkins -pointedly inverting his own over-riding qualification -when he had acknowledged "the insufficiency of Philosophicall reasons" to explain God's purposes. Yet this was precisely what Wilkins wanted. Where Scripture explicitly stated that instances when the Sun stood still were "miraculous", Wilkins wished them classified as "ordinary workes of Nature". If allowed to stand, this would turn what had been divine events, proper to theology, into everyday phenomena, subject to astronomy and natural philosophy. Ross thus told Wilkins that he threatened to "confound the works of God, and of Nature". He would "turn Divinity into naturall Philosophy". 89 Ross responded directly to Wilkins's argument of disciplinary precedence by recalling the historical authorities he had cited for his opinion. It was not simply a matter of numbers of authorities, but of their quality. Wilkins's were hardly reputable judges. Pythagoras, for instance, had been a "sorcerer" -and besides, Copernicanism had not been his idea at all, but had been fathered on him by later heretics, in a strategy which Ross believed to be "ordinary in all Heretickes and Sectaries". Nicholas of Cusa, too, was a renegade even among papists. It was, in short, a motley and disreputable ancestry: from ancient mystics and nonexistent pagans, geokinesis had been adopted by modern papists, sorcerers and atheists. 90 Such figures gave the lie to Wilkins's protestations of prudence.
Ross thus saw in Wilkins's work only perpetual discord. His opponent's proposed civility made no allowance for the final, binding arbitration of disputes. To Ross this could only lead to chaos -an awful prospect for one to whom order was nothing less than the representation on Earth of God's kingdom. His alternative was a return to the mediated authority of Scripture, the Fathers and approved ancient writers. The arbiters in disputes were to be those licensed by the court to interpret these texts: clerics, authorized philosophers, and collegiate physicians. Their knowledge was to be mediated to future generations by pedants like Ross. Above all there must reign a single final arbiter. According to Ross, stable knowledge depended on the monarch. When eclipsed, the lack of royal "irradiation" permitted individual subjects to fall prey to their own "strange fancies, which they call new lights". 91 Withholding assent would be just a step towards such unrestrained "singularity". The effect of Wilkins's prudence would be to undermine harmony, both on the practical, social level of knowledge-making and adjudication, and on the metaphorical and divine level of cosmology. Moving the Earth away from the centre of the universe would "take away that order which God hath placed in the creatures", and "bring in a strange confusion". Wilkins must be "Planet-struck, or have a planeticall head" to consider it. 92 "What hope is there to end controversies", Ross demanded, "when many are so wedded to their own phansies"? 93 This was probably written in 1641, at much the time Ross moved from Southampton to London. By 1646, when it appeared in print, Prynne had presided in grim triumph over the trial and execution of Laud, the king's headquarters in Oxford had fallen to the Parliamentary forces, and Charles himself had slipped north and surrendered to the Scots. There were brief hopes of peace. But Thomas Edwards's Gangraena had just appeared, one of many texts to list in scandalized detail the hordes of sectarians perceived to be running wild in war-torn Britain. Never again could a single Church honestly aspire to embody the religion of the entire nation. And an opportunity had been presented to Wilkins, who would shortly be intruded as Warden (Master) of Wadham College, and to his emerging allies. As Hobbes was to maintain, however, it remained far from clear that the advanced version of Wilkins's advice which they now followed could ever produce an end to disputes. Hobbes would continue to argue that the practical application of modest civility instantiated in the making and reporting of "experiments" could therefore never produce real knowledge. Shapin and Schaffer have famously restored to view the power and point of Hobbes's criticisms. In insisting that "knowledge, as much as the State, is the product of human actions", they conclude, "Hobbes was right". It is a phrase which has crystallized responses to their interpretation. 94 But Alexander Ross, too, had argued that Wilkins's advocated conduct would lead to unconfined discordnot because of any reliance on experiments, but because of its authorial "singularity". And this, as much as experiment itself, was a characteristic component of the new philosophy. 95 Had he lived, Ross would probably have viewed the Restoration virtuosi with similar disdain. He might have watched with maudlin concern the revival of the dissenters, and the plots of the Restoration Crisis in which the struggles of the Civil War were refought in the streets and law-courts of London. And he might even have sat back in his garret and murmured to himself: "Ross, too, was right."
PRUDENCE PREVAILS
Wilkins's reputation as Warden of Wadham has remained high since soon after the Restoration. At the time, however, he had his opponents, among the godly quite as much as among the cavaliers. "World in the Moon" Wilkins, as the pamphleteers knew him, was not able to keep some of the more recalcitrant Caroline scholars from leaving Oxford, but he actively defended open episcopalians like Seth Ward and John Fell, and for that he attracted puritan opprobrium. He "openly professed ... that he would rather have civill gratefull men in his house, then those that wear godly & ungratefull", a shocked Henry Bartlett told Richard Baxter in 1654. 96 While it may have repelled Bartlett, though, Wilkins's dictum was central to his success in fostering what later became known as the experimental philosophy.
At Oxford, Wilkins concerned himself with the matters of knowledge which had been articulated in his exchange with Ross. Knowledge, he told his scholars, concerned "the speculation of Nature". The state of "Real knowledge" being evidently imperfect, he continued, "we have little reason to be proud of, or to trust in that knowledge we have already attained ". The patristics and Aristotelianism of the 1630s could no longer be relied upon to channel safely, let alone to resolve, disagreements. But the urgings of John Webster and others that the universities adopt chymical philosophies promised no improvement. By encouraging belief in inspirational revelations, they, too, fanned the flames of singularity, of passion and pride. The dogmatism of Webster's arguments -especially in favour of Copernicanism, where they were "enough to fright a serious man from the beliefe of it" -bespoke "what a credulous fanatick Reformer he is like to prove". Indeed, so much did Webster's case imply subjection to the passions that Wilkins sardonically suggested Ross as his most suitable antagonist. 97 What was really needed was a different, civil form of natural inquiry and authorship.
But Wilkins did not altogether repudiate the notion of a passionate pathology of knowledge. Pursuing and professing knowledge in the wrong manner was liable to lead to what he called "the disease of curiosity". "Pedantic" learning in particular, he maintained, was "apt to infect a man with such odd humours of pride, and affectation, and curiosity, as will render him unfit for any great employment". Sufferers would "wander about after all kind of varieties", experiencing the intense melancholy from which came disorder. This much was a commonplace, and an ancient one at that. Ross himself had endorsed it. "Curiositie is dangerous", he had warned: "pry not too much into the secrets of heaven, lest ... your understanding be taken from you; & ye become a prey to the beastly imaginations of your owne brain." Such identification of "curiosity" with the passions and singularity, and hence discord, was frequent, but could nonetheless be consequential. "Curiosity, that Greensickness of the soul, ... hath been the Epidemical distemper of the Age we live in", asserted Edward Stillingfleet at the Restoration. He meant that conflicts over knowledge had underlain social and cultural collapse. Wilkins was thus in a sense acknowledging, and even appropriating, fears like Ross's of the dangers inherent in permitting those of "a curious humour" to take up new philosophies. He insisted that when interpreting Scripture, in particular, subjects must not be permitted to "consult with [their] owne fancies" without limit. Those who did displayed a disturbing readiness to engage in rash disputation, and were not fit members of a commonwealth. 98 The solution, Wilkins declared, lay in what he called "Society". He ascribed a specific meaning to this term. Just as towns gathered together into corporations, trades into companies, and religions into churches, so those eager to further knowledge needed to gather into academies embodying the right kind of "society". The purpose of such academies would be "mutual converse". "A readiness to communicate" was the first quality needed for "the rectifying of our judgments", since this set bounds to the individual fancy; and "society" institutionalized such communication. The openness which this kind of community allowed to manifest itself, however, rested in turn on the essential personal quality of "moderation". Since members of a society could not always "agree in the same apprehension of things", want of such moderation must eventually lead to conflict, perhaps even of a Hobbesian intensity: "and thus would men grow wild and savage, the benefits of Society would be lost, and mankind destroyed out of the world." It was therefore the fundamental "duty" of Christians always to display moderation "upon all occasions of difference and contests with one another". The commonweal itself depended upon this quality. In other words, Wilkins now advanced his own concept of a republic of letters, bound by common manners, as the necessary response to singularity. That was why what so appalled the godly Bartlett was to Wilkins indispensable for the maintenance of both a peaceful polity and safe knowledge. 99 At Wadham, and later in the Restoration, Wilkins put these principles of society and modesty into philosophical practice. Well-known for his indulgence of dissenters, Bishop Wilkins's two most characteristic qualities remained his "moderation" and his "sincerity". 100 At the Royal Society, he and Robert Boyle personified the virtues of the new philosophy more than any other figures. By the later 1660s the characterization of experimental philosophy in opposition to "pedantry" was entrenched; it was prominently displayed by Sprat and Glanvill. In Wilkins's earlier exchange with Ross, however, we can see this new propriety being stipulated. In summary, this paper has attemped to reconstruct that process by excavating the issues at stake in their confrontation. It has argued, first, that bookish philosophy of the kind urged by Alexander Ross was by no means self-evidently absurd. Others have maintained a similar point by looking at altogether more important figures. 101 But the paper then looked in detail at the use of such learning for "pedantry". It has suggested that for Ross, at least, pedantry could seem a promising strategy in the 1630s. Appeals to the establishment of social harmony by the regulation of the passions were then timely, and his obeisance to "traditional" authorities served the purpose. Then, however, Ross encountered a different model of advocacy in the shape of Wilkins's tracts on the Moon and the motion of the Earth. His response has here been reassessed in terms of a debate about the propriety of philosophical authorship in a disintegrating political realm. Wilkins, for his part, worked to make Ross into what one might call an avatar. He identified him as the personification of a kind of ill-mannered obstinacy which, he claimed, combined error with violence. He then defined and defended himself by pointing to significant contrasts with this avatar. We see here, then, the making of an ideal of what authorship should beand, inseparably, the stipulation of a contrasting ideal of what authorship must not be. If "the author" emerged at this juncture, then so did the anti-author, or "pedant" as that term is now construed. Ross was its archetype.
